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a b s t r a c t 
Publishing data in open format is a growing trend, particularly for public bodies who have 
a legal obligation to make data available as open data. We look at the privacy implications 
of publishing open data and, in particular, how organisations can make informed decisions 
around privacy risks in relation to open data publishing before publication occurs. 
Using a well established theoretical privacy assessment framework, Contextual Integrity, 
we illustrate how this can be translated into a practical meta-model that can assist public 
bodies in assessing what privacy implications or risks might be associated with making a 
particular dataset available as open data. 
We validate the meta-model by providing a worked example and illustrate the effective- 
ness of this by reference to a case study application where the meta-model was successfully 
applied in practice. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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(. Introduction 
rivacy impacts many aspects of our life. At one time, privacy 
as mainly concerned with who divulged what and to whom.
owever, while our expectations about how confidential infor- 
ation will remain if shared with friends, family, or even so- 
ial media are likely to be met, this may not be the case with 
overnment departments ( public bodies ). Public bodies might 
ollect data about our property values and assign this to our 
ame and address. These datasets contain private or sensi- 
ive information about us and we accept that government bod- 
es need our personal information to conduct their business,
nd willingly provide details of our lives; such details range 
rom registering the birth of our children to providing details 
f our households on census days. However, while at one time 
t might be assumed that any information gathered by a pub- 
ic body would only be used for the purpose for which it was ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: jhenriksenbulmer@bournemouth.ac.uk (J. Henriksen
w
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.01.003 
167-4048/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an ope
 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) riginally collected, the introduction of Open Government and 
pen data have changed this. 
Open Government seeks to increase transparency and citi- 
en participation and collaboration through making data eas- 
ly accessible ( Obama, 2009 ). To this end, so far, more than 70
ountries have made a commitment to open government and 
aking public data available as open data ( Open Government 
artnership, 2016 ). Open data is data that is freely available 
or anyone to download, share and re-use with no restrictions 
n re-use or re-distribution save for perhaps a requirement to 
eference the source ( Open Data Institute, 2016 ). The issue is 
hat, in meeting this commitment, public bodies need to be 
ure that any data they publish in open format does not con- 
ain personal or sensitive data, i.e. data that identifies or can 
e used to aid in identifying individual citizens. 
We contend that while making data freely available is,
n principle, a very good idea, it does raise questions about 
hat safeguards will be placed on publishing such data. With -Bulmer). 
n access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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 cyber crime on the increase, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse re-
port that nearly 8000 data breaches have been made public
since 2005, thereby exposing in excess of 10 billion records
( Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2018 ). 
Existing guidelines offer direction on what public bodies
should publish, types of data, and their format. They do not,
however, provide much privacy guidance beyond ensuring
that data protection regulations are adhered to. This lack of
‘usable’ guidance in relation to privacy leaves public body of-
ficials with little direction for how best to proceed when pub-
lishing their datasets as open data. 
We seek to address this gap by demonstrating how pri-
vacy can be incorporated into the decision making process
for open data prior to publication. In this domain there is an
added complexity in that, in most cases, any data released as
open data by a public body is likely to be historic data. There-
fore, from the perspective of the practitioner who determines
whether or not a dataset is suitable for publication, he or she
is not necessarily concerned with how the data was collected,
processed or stored originally, nor the security risks associ-
ated with those practices. Rather, the concern of the practi-
tioner will be to assess the datasets’ suitability for publication
in open format, and then perhaps, based on that decision, he
or she may look at how the data can be safeguarded going for-
ward. However, for the purpose of this paper, the technical as-
pects of collecting and safeguarding the data are not part of
the consideration. 
This paper makes three contributions. First, we present a
conceptual meta-model for identifying and assessing privacy
risk based on Contextual Integrity (CI), a theoretical privacy
framework created by Nissenbaum (2010) . This model was de-
vised to help practitioners make privacy decisions in open
data publishing, thereby providing a visual aide-memoire for
practitioners for how CI can be applied in practice. Second, we
illustrate the rigour and application of the meta-model by ap-
plying the concepts discussed to a hypothetical public body,
a public library, in a worked example. Third, we evaluate the
model by applying it in a practical case study working with
real data in a real setting ( Henriksen-Bulmer and Faily, 2017 ),
thereby demonstrating the significance and effectiveness of
the framework and model. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We begin
with a brief review of our findings on UK public bodies atti-
tudes to open data publishing, based on a series of contextual
interviews in Section 2 . We then review the related work in
Section 3 by outlining existing legal privacy protection, consid-
ering how organisations make decisions around risk and pri-
vacy, and considering why context needs to form part of any
privacy assessment. In Section 4 , we present a meta-model
for Contextual Integrity (CI) ( Nissenbaum, 2010 ): a visual rep-
resentation that demonstrates how CI can be applied in prac-
tice, which will initially evaluate using a worked example in
Section 5 . In Section 6 , we evaluate the meta-model by using to
inform a real world practical application of CI, working in col-
laboration with a UK Local Authority ( Henriksen-Bulmer and
Faily, 2017 ). We discuss the implications for design of our de-
signs in Section 7 , before outlining the limitations of this work
and directions for future work in Sections 8 and 9 , respectively.
Finally, we summarise our findings and contributions made in
Section 10 . 2. Public bodies attitude to open data 
publishing 
To establish to what extent public bodies currently publish
data in open format, we submitted a freedom of information
(FOI) request to 22 local authorities (LA) covering three regions
in the UK ( Henriksen-Bulmer and Faily, 2017 ). The FOI request
asked whether; (i) the LA published open data; (ii) the LA had
a open data portal or website; (iii) the LA contribute to the na-
tional open data portal; (iv) who was responsible for open data
publication; and (v) what their role is within the LA. We found
that all published something, but only 37% had some form of
open data platform or portal. We also found the role and/or
department responsible for open data publishing varies con-
siderably across the LA’s contacted. As a result, many practi-
tioners responsible for open data publishing, undertake this
as a secondary responsibility, i.e. in addition to their primary
role (e.g. legal officer also responsible for open data). 
In addition, to gauge how widely open data publishing has
been adopted by public bodies, we conducted contextual in-
terviews ( Beyer and Holtzblatt, 1998 ) with 4 practitioners from
two public bodies. We found that while the positive aspects
of open data publication were acknowledged, e.g. one practi-
tioner commented: “by opening up information to people you can
foster growth” (P1). The norm in practice appears to be not to
publish until pressure dictates otherwise: “Why do we have to
do anything when we can get away with the bare minimum?” (P3). 
One reason put forward for non-publication was the fear
the privacy could be compromised by publication, one practi-
tioner stated “I am almost convinced that if I went back through
our data that we have published over the last 4–5 years, I would
find something that we’d missed [referring to personal data be-
ing inadvertently published]” (P2). This may explain why only
37% of LA’s currently have an open data portal. We therefore
contend, that if privacy is to be incorporated into corporate
practice, it needs to become an integral part of organisational
decision making ( Bamberger and Mulligan, 2015 ). Based on
these findings we decided to examine what legal regulations
are in place to safeguard privacy and what privacy assessment
frameworks are available to practitioners that they can use to
inform decisions around data privacy. 
3. Related work 
3.1. Data protection as a privacy safeguard 
Any data processing is subject to adherence to data protec-
tion laws. In the UK these can be found under the Data Pro-
tection Act 2018 (DPA) ( UK Parliament, 2018 ), the UK’s enact-
ment of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This
act governs what the public body and their employees may do
with data pertaining to individuals. Under DPA the people in-
volved with handing the data are referred to as data processors
who maintain and manipulate the data, and data controllers ,
who are responsible for making decisions about the data and
whether or not the data may be shared. Data processors and
controllers must adhere to strict data protection principles
and ensure that personal data is processed: lawfully, fairly and
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an a transparent manner; that the minimum necessary data is 
ollected and processed and for the specified purposes only; 
ccurately; kept for no longer than necessary; and appropri- 
tely safeguarded. 
Despite this, two obvious issues remain. First, while data 
rotection laws may dictate that personal information needs 
rotection, the safeguarding of this protection is restricted 
o what the data controller and/or processor does with the 
ata. Provided they do not publish identifying information such 
s names, addresses or dates of birth, that obligation has 
een met. Second, data protection is one-dimensional; what 
onstitutes personal data is limited to the sensitivity of the 
ndividual attributes within the data. Once data has been 
nonymised and data subjects are no longer identifiable, data 
s no longer subject to data protection, as it is no longer con- 
idered personal or sensitive ( ICO, 2012 ). Previous work has 
hown that anonymisation can be reversed ( El Emam et al.,
011 ), particularly when multiple datasets are aggregated or 
inked ( Henriksen-Bulmer and Jeary, 2016 ). This makes the re- 
ease of public body data in open format potentially incom- 
atible with data protection laws ( Kulk, 2012 ). 
.2. Data, organisational decision making and risk 
he findings from FOI requests and initial discussions with 
ublic servants appear to suggest that open data predomi- 
antly consists of existing data. This means that, for the most 
art, any safeguards that are in place around data processing 
nd release have been pre-determined prior to the open data 
ractitioner needing to decide whether a particular dataset 
hould or should not be published. Therefore, what needs to 
e reviewed is not the safeguards already in place or how to 
anage these, rather, it is the decision making process to 
etermine the suitability or not of publishing data in open 
ormat. 
A popular method for informing decision making within 
rganisations is through risk assessment which has been used 
o define level of exposure, cost or potential impact of a deci- 
ion, or ‘alternate solutions’ to a problem with an organisation 
 Simon, 1955 ). Risk is an attempt to define the uncertainty in 
ore practical terms. Indeed, it has been contended that risk 
is inseparable from decision-making” ( Galanc et al., 2016 ). For 
xample, the way business looks to protect data is through 
ecurity measures and conducting security risk assessments,
sing frameworks from recognised international bodies such 
s the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NIST), or the International Organisation for Standards (ISO),
ho have produced guidelines for assessing security risks ( BS 
SO 27000:2017, 2017 ; NIST, 2012 ) and, as part of such secu- 
ity risk assessment, privacy risk ( BS ISO/IEC 29100:2011, 2011 ; 
IST, 2010 ). The problem is that these measures in them- 
elves may not be enough. For instance, a business might seek 
o make accessing the data difficult by password protecting 
he PC or the data, which has given rise to usability issues 
nd therefore proved ineffective in many instances ( Sasse 
t al., 2001 ). Additional layers of protection can be added by 
or example, obfuscating or anonymising the data ( Samarati,
001 ). The problem here being that research has shown that 
nonymisation can be reversed ( Henriksen-Bulmer and Jeary,
016; Ohm, 2010 ). We contend this approach alone forms part of the problem 
ecause, what organisations are actually trying to protect with 
hese security measures, is to safeguard the data and data pri- 
acy, and therefore, privacy risk. Currently privacy risk is con- 
idered as one element of security risk, meaning privacy risk 
ecomes a secondary consideration that may result in inap- 
ropriate or ineffective security measures being put in place 
o protect against it. By viewing the data separately though a 
rivacy risk lens, there is a better chance of correctly identi- 
ying each privacy risk so that the most appropriate security 
easure can be applied for that risk. 
One framework that looks specifically at privacy risk is the 
rivacy Impact Assessment (PIA), used in multiple countries 
or assessing general privacy risks ( David et al., 2013 ). How- 
ver, the PIA is predominantly geared towards assessing pri- 
acy risks to a new project, process or system so that appropri- 
te mitigation and security strategies can be incorporated into 
he design and/or implementation. However, it does not look 
t existing data or processes. More recently the new Data Pro- 
ection Impact Assessment (DPIA) introduced as part of GDPR 
as widened the scope to make DPIAs compulsory (GDPR, Ar- 
icle 25) for any high risk data processing. Whilst the DPIA may 
nclude looking at privacy risks for existing processes or data,
t asks practitioners to consider privacy risks, not from the per- 
pective of the organisation but from the perspective of the in- 
ividual (i.e. the data subject) and how the risk might impact 
he data subject. 
.3. Privacy risk in context 
ttempts have been made to consider privacy risk to indi- 
iduals in terms of setting privacy goals as part of conduct- 
ng DPIAs. For example, Bieker et al. have sought to incorpo- 
ate context into the privacy risk assessment process ( Bieker 
t al., 2016 ), thereby demonstrating the importance of includ- 
ng context in any privacy risk assessment However, this work 
ooks at privacy risks in terms of identifying potential threats,
kin to security and privacy threat modelling schemes e.g.
RIS ( Faily and Fléchais, 2009 ) and LINDDUN ( Deng et al., 2011 ),
hich focuses on new processes, systems and projects to en- 
ure safeguards are in place, rather than assess what data is 
lready there and whether this is safe to publish. 
Other scholars that have considering context as part of 
ecision making around privacy, adopt slightly different ap- 
roaches. For example, Mulligan et al. look at privacy risk in 
erms of risk of harm ( Mulligan et al., 2016 ), while Solove con-
ider all aspects of all the areas where a person’s privacy might 
e compromised or breached, including a number of concepts 
hat relate to an individual’s physical environment as well as 
nformational privacy ( Solove, 2006 ). What is not considered 
n any depth as part of these frameworks is the human ele- 
ent, how people behave and perceive privacy and how the 
ontext within which data is shared may be affected by those 
ehaviours, values and norms. 
An alternative framework is contextual integrity (CI), a the- 
retical privacy taxonomy that incorporates these nuances in- 
luding the human element ( Nissenbaum, 2004 ). CI asks that 
ractitioners consider the: people, i.e. actors, i.e. the sender, re- 
eiver and subject (the data subject) of the data ; data attributes 
nd data flows transmission principles as part of the privacy 
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 assessment and that these elements are considered within
context ( Nissenbaum, 2010 ). 
This framework provides an opportunity for privacy to
be considered strategically before technical intervention, and
thus, we decided to use this framework as a basis for creating
a conceptual model (meta-model) that can be applied to open
data publishing. 
3.4. Existing applications of the CI framework 
Previous research using CI has predominantly been defined
and discussed in theory ( Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2011; Sar and
Al-Saggaf, 2013 ). Other work has considered public bodies re-
leasing data in open format and privacy, notably, the Berkeley
Law and Technology Center, who have published papers dis-
cussing this domain, e.g. Berkeley Law (2016) , none of these
however, have applied CI in this context. Where CI has been
applied in practice, it has been applied retrospectively as a
theoretical discussion to a specific problem or domain ( Conley
et al., 2012 ), or it has been applied as part of a system design
process ( Barth et al., 2006; Krupa and Vercouter, 2012 ). For ex-
ample, in one study CI was applied through tags attached in
the message headers ( Krupa and Vercouter, 2012 ), while Barth
et al. (2006) used CI to devise a system for controlling data flow
between user roles so that the system could compute access
controls. 
In doing so, what these studies have done is to apply CI
at a granular level, rather than holistically as part of an over-
arching privacy decision-making process. Thus, although pre-
vious work illustrates how the CI framework can be applied,
these studies are insufficient for guiding decision-making in
open data publishing. In this domain, there are a number of
constraints and unique considerations that need taking into
account. First, the data being assessed will be existing data
that has been created as part of a function of the public body
unrelated to open data publication. Therefore, any decisions
about what data and how this data has been collected, pro-
cessed and stored will be historically pre-determined, and the
decision-maker will most likely not have been involved in de-
cisions around these factors. Second, for those datasets it will
not be possible to fully define all elements because the role
of the recipient cannot be specifically defined; anyone who
downloads the data will be a recipient, and the data, once pub-
lished, will be available to everyone. 
4. Creating the meta-model 
The idea of creating a conceptual model of contextual in-
tegrity (CI) is to provide public body practitioners with a vi-
sual aid that will depict CI at a glance. It will illustrate how
a staged approach to determining whether or not a particu-
lar dataset contains potentially privacy sensitive information
and/or could present a risk of privacy being violated and thus,
can assist in making informed privacy decisions. Moreover,
modelling CI can also be used to inform the development of
potential privacy risk decision-making tool support that may
help automate and streamline some of this process for practi-
tioners going forward. The meta-model is intended as a prac-
tical, usable tool that will guide practitioners through CI andthe privacy assessment process, culminating in a decision, to
publish or not to publish. For validation, an explanation is pro-
vided at each stage for how the meta-model has been aligned
with Nissenbaum’s framework ( Nissenbaum, 2010 ). 
The modelling technique that will be used to visually rep-
resent how CI can be applied in practice is the Unified Mod-
elling Language (UML). UML diagramming is a universal vi-
sual language that is used to capture and represent concepts
and the relationships between them ( Rumbaugh et al., 2004 )
and therefore, this method has been chosen to visually rep-
resent and illustrate each phase of the meta-model, thereby
providing readers with an easy point of reference and a bet-
ter overview of how the elements relate within each phase
( Fowler, 2004 ). 
To create the meta-model, two guiding sets of principles
from Nissenbaum’s framework were identified as being core
to applying CI in practice: 
Key elements: The meta-model uses Explanation, Risk Assess-
ment and Decision in place of Nissembaum’s Explanation,
Evaluation and Prescription (referred to by Nissenbaum as
the “3 Key Elements”; Nissenbaum, 2010 ) to better align
with terminology that practitioners will relate to and
to aid the flow of the staged approach that the meta-
model will be asking practitioners to follow. These three
elements have been used as overarching themes in
the meta-model to frame the logical progression of the
model into understandable, logical progression phases.
Decision heuristics: Nissenbaum proposes 9 decision heuris-
tics (DH) that should be considered in relation to both
existing and proposed new information flows. These
have been used within the phases to delineate and ex-
pand on the areas that need to be be considered in prac-
tice and help establish whether privacy is likely to be, or
has been, breached by a proposed new flow of informa-
tion ( Nissenbaum, 2010 ). 
4.1. Phase I – explanation 
The explanation element refers to the practice or system to be
assessed. These should be assessed in view of any “context-
relative informational norms” that may be breached. This
should include an assessment of the key “actors”, i.e. the peo-
ple that are/could be affected and their “roles”, as ‘data sub-
jects’; ‘data senders’ or ‘data receivers’. It should also consider
the “open dataset” (‘attributes’), i.e. the information itself (the
data) and how this information is transmitted (“transmission
principles”) and whether any changes to these elements po-
tentially violate the existing or proposed new information flow
(see Fig. 1 ). 
To incorporate the DH’s into the meta-model, it was de-
termined that the first four DH’s relate to gathering a more
detailed overview of the data; the people (actors); the existing
informational norms and transmission principles. The first
decision heuristic (DH1), concerns the data itself and how it
is proposed the data is to be transmitted. The second asks
us to consider the existing context of the situation and envi-
ronment surrounding the data and the people involved (DH2).
The third, concerns the people involved with the data (DH3);
and the fourth, seeks to establish how the data is currently
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Fig. 1 – Explanation – class relationships. 
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transmitted (DH4) ( Nissenbaum, 2010 ). Thus, these four DH’s 
ere used to depict the explanation elements and how they 
elate. At a more detailed level, explanation therefore requires 
hat details are collected about the data itself, the people in- 
olved and their roles, how the data is transmitted and the 
ontext. Thus, the explanation is the superclass with each of 
he elements below depicted as subclasses (see Fig. 1 ). 
Fig. 1 shows the relationship between the subclasses which 
an be explained as follows: 
Open dataset: Each dataset needs to be considered sepa- 
rately to avoid overcomplicating the decision-making 
process and ensure all elements are thoroughly consid- 
ered and CI is maintained throughout the assessment 
of each dataset. Within the dataset will be the individ- 
ual data items the attributes , grouped by attribute type: 
Identifiers i.e. data that can directly identify an individ- 
ual, such as their name, national insurance number or 
date of birth; Quasi-identifiers i.e. data that is not directly 
identifying but likely to be if linked, e.g. age or gender 
( Thomson et al., 2005 ); Sensitive attributes i.e. individual 
specific data that could aid in identifying an individual,
such as ethnic origin, religious beliefs, disease or salary 
( Fung et al., 2010 ); and Non-sensitive attributes i.e. non- 
identifying, even if linked. 
Actors: Each actor will act in one or more capacities. At data 
level, the actor will perform a data transmission role 
as either sender, receiver or subject of the data being 
transmitted. It is also possible that an actor can take 
on multiple roles. For example, the data sender or the 
data subject may also download the data and thus, also 
become the receiver. Beyond the data transmission role 
however, the actor will also perform multiple relation- 
ship and/or work roles. Thus, to allow for these nuances 
to be taken into account, the roles have been separated 
out as a class of its own. Roles: with each actor acting in one or more roles in re- 
lation to the data. Therefore, each actor may be as- 
sociated with multiple roles, which may be based on 
relationships, context or duties as follows: Relations i.e.
details of relationships between the actors, e.g personal 
and/or professional; Interactions i.e. information about 
how the actor(s) interacts e.g. citizen to professional or 
friend to citizen; Data Handling i.e. information about 
actor input(s)/output(s) in handling the data; Work i.e.
the occupation of the actor, this may be their job title 
or their profession (e.g. lawyer, customer service officer 
etc.); and Data Originating i.e. details about the role of 
the data originator who may be third party and thus, the 
role of that third party needs to be considered as well. 
Context: Capturing information about the context of how 
and why the data was captured in the first place (the pre- 
vailing context ). These contexts are: Purpose i.e. the orig- 
inal purpose of why the data was collected; Social i.e.
the social context in which the data was collected (e.g.
benefits department = tax collection/payment context); 
Consent i.e. whether consent has been obtained and, if 
so, the validity of consent obtained also needs to be 
considered. 
Transmission principles: Referring to the data flows between 
actors. 
.2. Phase II – risk assessment 
he second key element, risk assessment , consists of an evalu- 
tion of any privacy risks associated with a particular practice 
r transmission within a given context, taking into account 
ow the information is conveyed or shared and the actors in- 
olved with that practice or transmission. Effectively, what the 
isk assessment is trying to achieve is an assessment of the 
isks associated with any proposed changes or alterations in 
he data flow. A privacy risk is “the probability” or “likelihood”
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Fig. 2 – Activity diagram: risk assessment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and “consequence” of a loss of, or violation of, an individual’s
privacy ( BS ISO 31000:2009, 2009 ; BS ISO/IEC 29100:2011, 2011 ).
Thus, in the meta-model a privacy risk can be defined as a dis-
closure risk, e.g. the risk of re-identification occurring if data
is released in it’s current format. 
The risk assessment phase considers DH numbers five to
eight, as these all relate to the evaluation or risk assessment of
how the proposed new information flow will affect the privacy
of the actors ( Nissenbaum, 2010 ). Fig. 2 shows the informa-
tion gathered in the explanation phase from the; data, actors,
transmission principles and prevailing context feeding in to
the risk assessment. 
The risk assessment asks for the following aspects to be
considered: 
Norms: These can be described as the standards or rules
by which we conduct our lives, formal or informal. In
terms of CI, the informational norms are what must be
considered, i.e. the norms that the actors will be ex-
pected to abide by in the capacity of their role, for ex-
ample, a teacher may divulge a student’s performance
record to the student or their parents but would not be
expected to divulge the same to other parents within
the school. The informational norms need to be con-
sidered in relation to the evaluation criterion to deter-
mine whether they the proposed change in data flow
could result in any infringement or breach of: Auton-
omy/Freedom; Beliefs or belief systems e.g. religious,
political or strong opinions; Informational harm; Dis-
crimination; Confidentiality; Trust; or Security. 
Values: These are “the objects around which a context is
oriented” ( Nissenbaum, 2010 ). These may be social, po-
litical or ethical values that could be affected or altered
as a result of the proposed new information flow, askingwhether it is possible that the proposed new data flow
could impose an imbalance of some sort and thereby in-
fringe of one or more of these values. These values will,
of course, need to be considered in light of the norms
and any legal or regulatory constraints or obligations. 
Regulations: Referring to any legal obligations that may be
imposed on the public body in relation to the data. This
may be constraints such as DPA regulations, or oblig-
atory, such as the Re-use of Public Sector Information
Regulations 2015 (ROPSIR) which require public bodies
to publish data in open format. 
Disclosure risk: This looks at the information from the ex-
planation phase and asking what the disclosure risk will
be in light of: the entrenched informational norms; any
points departure from the entrenched informational
norms identified; whether consent has been granted
and, if so, to what extent consent has been granted; the
impact of any potential breach; any proposed mitiga-
tion strategies put in place; and any proposed controls
in place or to be put in place. 
Once all of these considerations have been taken into ac-
count, the final step of the risk assessments involves con-
ducting a positive impact assessment. Assessing the poten-
tial positive impact is intended to capture relevant changes
that, while they may represent a perceived “deviation from
entrenched norms” or values, could actually have a positive
rather than negative impact ( Nissenbaum, 2010 ). Take for ex-
ample, a new technology innovation developed such as when
the smart phone was first introduced. At the time, many peo-
ple, including the lead researcher, felt the use of a smart phone
posed too much of an infringement on personal privacy as
users would be permanently contactable and locatable. How-
ever, most users now accept this fact and being contactable
all the time could be argued to now be an “entrenched norm”.
Thus, this shows that even entrenched norms and values may
be subject to change over time, illustrating the importance of
assessing both positive and negative impacts. Therefore, the
final step entails assessing: 
Positive values: This should detail any positive values that
publication will bring such as improvement in trans-
parency or commercial gain. 
Overriding values Outlining any overriding reason why pub-
lication should go ahead, such as a legal obligation to
publish the data. 
4.3. Phase III – decision 
The third key element, decision , relates to the findings on
whether a practice violates privacy. This involves presenting
the findings which will guide the practitioner in whether or
not a practice or process poses a potential challenge to privacy.
This, it is contended, involves making a decision as to the com-
patibility or non-compatibility of the information for allowing
those changes or alterations in the data flow. In this phase, the
final heuristic (DH9) has been used to ask whether, based on
the findings made in the previous considerations; “contextual
integrity recommends for or against the proposed new prac-
tices” ( Nissenbaum, 2010 ). In the decision phase there are only
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Table 1 – Library lending register – extract. 
Customer ID Name Address Books on loan 
12345 Alice Smith A Street 5 
23456 Bob Jones B Street 1 
34567 Eve Evans E Street 2 
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owo stages. The decision itself and recording the outcome, the 
ctivity flow for this phase is depicted in Fig. 3 . 
The decision process consists of the following: 
Risk assessment : The Risk Assessment will be carried over 
from Phase II (as discussed in Section 4.2 ). This will 
feed into the decision element to produce an outcome.
This outcome will hold the decision from each attribute 
group, contributing a score to aid the practitioner in 
making a decision. 
Outcome : Once the decision has been made the outcome 
will need to be recorded and any actions identified as 
follows: Finding i.e. the decision itself, i.e. a ‘to publish’ or 
‘not to publish’ decision; and Reason i.e. the justification 
and reasoning behind the decision made, this could, for 
example, refer to legal compliance such as ‘Data Protec- 
tion’ or a ‘no privacy issues found’ reasoning. 
If the decision is to publish the following additional at- 
ributes will also need to be completed: 
Mitigating steps This category will detail any mitigating 
steps that need to be carried out before publication can 
take place, this may, for instance, include redaction or 
anonymisation. 
Actors: Recording who is responsible, accountable, con- 
sulted and informed (RACI) going forward as part of the 
process helps achieve transparency and provide assur- 
ance that proper process is followed in making, imple- 
menting and enforcing decisions made. Thus, part of 
the record involves completing a responsibility matrix 
( Project Management Institute, 2004 ) that outlines who 
is: Responsible for publication; Accountable depicting who 
is accountable if the decision is challenged or there is a 
problem (there can only be one person accountable in a RACI matrix); who must be Consulted and Informed of the 
decision. 
Time: Enabling details of how regularly the open data pub- 
lished will be updated (if relevant). 
. Worked example 
his section seeks to provide an illustration of how the meta- 
odel can be applied in practice by providing a worked exam- 
le for each concept discussed above. This will take the form 
f a public body practitioner (“PB”). To give the PB some con- 
ext we will give him the role of Data Officer and have him
mployed at the local Lending Library, applying the concepts 
o ascertain what privacy risks a hypothetical dataset, the “Li- 
rary Lending Register”, will pose if it was to be published in 
pen format. 
.1. Explanation 
or the explanation phase, the PB will need to capture details 
f the Library Lending Register (i.e. the ‘Open Dataset’ in Fig. 1 ).
Following the meta-model, to conduct the privacy risk as- 
essment, the PB will need to capture which attribute groups 
or columns) are contained within the dataset being assessed.
or example, if the dataset being assessed is the Lending Reg- 
ster of books on loan, the PB will need to capture details of
ach attribute type (column within the database) which might 
nclude Customer ID, name, address and no of books on loan 
see Table 1 ). 
What the PB will need to capture is details of each col- 
mn header (attribute type) so that each attribute type can 
e assessed for potential privacy risks, i.e. for each group of 
ttributes, does that column contain attributes that are per- 
onal identifiers, quasi identifiers, sensitive or non-sensitive? 
n this example, the name will be a direct identifier; the cus- 
omer ID and address will be quasi-identifiers (they can link 
ack to the personal information if linked) and the number 
f books will be non-sensitive. Thus, most of these columns 
ontain potential identifying information. 
The PB will also need to capture details of who has been 
nvolved in handling the data and what their role(s) are (i.e.
he ‘Actors’ and ‘Roles’ in Fig. 1 ). This will involve looking at
hich department the data originated from, who works there 
nd particularly, who worked with the data within that de- 
artment (the data senders and data receivers). For the Library 
his might include a Librarian and a Learning Technologist.
n addition, the PB will need to ascertain who the data con- 
roller responsible for the dataset is, and for context, the PB 
ill need to capture details of how these people relate to each 
ther and the data subjects (i.e. Alice, Bob and Eve, the library 
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 customers), e.g. do they know them personally, are they re-
lated? etc. The PB will need to capture how the data is trans-
mitted, what format it is held in, e.g. is it in a spreadsheet, a
bespoke library lending database etc. Finally, the PB will need
to record how the data flows both within the organisation and
externally (i.e. the ‘Transmission Principles’ in Fig. 1 ). 
Once the PB has captured details of the data, actors, roles,
transmission principles and the prevailing context, risks can
be identified in light of legal obligations, established norms
and values. To this end the LA will need to determine how
publishing the data in open format might affect the trans-
mission flow and what privacy risks might be associated with
this new flow of data. This is captured in phase two, the risk
assessment. 
5.2. Risk assessment 
The risk assessment phase is where the PB will assess the
privacy risks associated with making the dataset available as
open data. This will involve reviewing the information cap-
tured as part of the evaluation and identifying any risks there
might be associated with the data (see ‘Disclosure Risk’ in
Fig. 2 ). For example, if the Librarian and Eve are friends, the
PB would need to note this relationship as a potential risk as
part of completing the risk assessment. For each of the risk
assessment areas the PB needs to note any associated privacy
risks. The fact that these two actors are friends could have po-
tential risk implications in a number of areas, meaning the PB
will need to consider the risks associated with each area: 
Disclosure risk : There could be a number of potential dis-
closure risks identified as a result of the friendship be-
tween the actors in this instance. For example, this
could include the relationship between the actors giv-
ing rise to a consideration about who the librarian may
share the data with and how appropriate such sharing
may be. It should also consider what the repercussions
would be if the librarian was to divulge information ob-
tained in the course of their work to a third party such
as another friend. Similarly, consideration will need to
be given as to whether or not Eve has given consent to
the data being processed and what that consent cov-
ers. Another risk associated with the friendship could
be that the Librarian may divulge personal information
about Bob (another library user) to Eve. 
Norms : The friendship could result in Eve receiving prefer-
ential treatment such as being allowed extra books on
loan (discrimination risk) or be privy to confidential in-
formation about Bob (trust and confidentiality risks). 
Regulations : Adherence to data protection regulations. For
instance, if Bob has not given consent for his data to
be shared, the divulging of the information to Eve will
constitute a breach of data protection regulations. 
Values : A breach of confidentiality would infringe on social
and ethical norms (see Fig. 2 ). 
Once all of the disclosure risks have been identified in light
of legal constraints, norms and values, the PB will need to de-
termine whether there are any mitigating steps that can be
taken to make the data available in open format. Then, the
PB can make an assessment of any associated privacy risks inpublication and use this to assist in making an informed de-
cision as to whether the Library Lending Register can be pub-
lished. This is captured in phase three, the decision. 
5.3. Decision 
The decision phase for our Lending Library is where the PB will
assess the privacy risks associated with making the dataset
available as open data (see Fig. 3 ) and, based on this, make
an informed decision (‘Decision’ in Fig. 3 ). As part of record-
ing the ‘Outcome’ in Fig. 3 , the PB will record the decision and
the outcome of the assessment. This should outline what the
finding from the assessment is; the reasoning behind the de-
cision and the mitigation steps identified and whether or not
these were applied and who will be responsible for what as-
pects of publication etc. (RACI) going forward. For the Privacy
Risk Assessment carried out on the Library Lending Register,
the mitigating steps could, for example, include: 
• Anonymisation the PB could advise that identifying at-
tributes should be anonymised prior to publication
( Lablans et al., 2015; Samarati, 2001 ). 
• Redaction the PB could recommend that personal identifiers
such as names, be redacted prior to publication ( ICO, 2012;
Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010 ). 
Once these steps have been completed the PB will have a
detailed record of the outcome of the privacy assessment that
includes the finding and the reason for the decision. This will
enable other practitioners within the public body to refer to
the decision made and provide the organisation with quality
assurance and an audit trail of decisions made. 
6. Applying the meta-model in practice using 
CLIFOD 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the meta-model, we applied
the principles to a real-life scenario in a case study, working in
collaboration with a UK Local Authority (LA) that publish open
data regularly ( Henriksen-Bulmer and Faily, 2017 ). For this case
study, we expanded on the concepts developed in the meta-
model by creating a step-by-step questionnaire for assessing
the privacy risks of publishing open data: ContextuaL Integrity
For Open Data (CLIFOD). This case study is discussed in the
next section. 
6.1. Methodology 
The case study was conducted using a case study method ( Yin,
2013 ), where the unit of evaluation was the LA. The LA was
chosen because, as a public body, not only do they have an
obligation to publish data in open format, they are also likely
to face more public scrutiny than a private organisation in
light of their status as acting for, and on behalf of, citizens
( Shakespeare, 2013 ). 
The research questions we asked were: RQ1 – in a practical
application with a public body organisation, Nissenbaum’s Contex-
tual Integrity (CI) framework will not work where one of the roles
cannot be specifically defined? and RQ2 Using the CI framework in
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(ts current format will result in most datasets being deemed unsuit- 
ble for publication? 
The case study was conducted in collaboration with two 
ractitioners from the LA who were responsible for open data 
ublication within the LA; a technical expert with extensive 
xperience of data management and open data publishing,
nd a practitioner with a policy and management background.
he method of data collection was a combination of contex- 
ual interviews ( Beyer and Holtzblatt, 1998 ) and think aloud 
 Davison et al., 1997 ). The reason for this combination was 
hat, due to distance restrictions and time constraints, the 
ase study could not be conducted face to face. Therefore, con- 
extual interview techniques by themselves, were not consid- 
red sufficient and the think aloud element was added to pro- 
ide a more robust technique in the given circumstances. 
Three LA datasets, which had already been deemed suit- 
ble for publication and published as open data by the LA were 
ssessed as part of the case study. Prior to this case study, the 
A did not have any formal privacy risk assessment processes 
n place, data was assessed by the practitioners in an ad-hoc,
on-systematic manner based on experience. Thus, whilst 
hese datasets had been assessed by the publishing practi- 
ioners, they had not been assessed through any formal pri- 
acy risk assessment, meaning that effectively, the case study 
nvolved re-evaluating the datasets for privacy risks using 
LIFOD. 
The actual case study was conducted by the lead re- 
earcher using a combination of telephone conferencing and 
oogle Docs. The visits to the LA and collaboration with the 
A was carried out by the lead researcher with the support- 
ng researchers providing guidance and advice throughout on 
ll aspects of the work. The researcher and practitioners went 
hrough CLIFOD over the phone and, simultaneously, the prac- 
itioners were given modify and share access to the CLIFOD 
pread sheet via Google Docs, enabling them to actively par- 
icipate in completing the questions within CLIFOD during the 
tudy. Then, as they worked through the questions with the 
esearcher, practitioners were asked to talk aloud, explaining 
heir answers. These answers were then captured by the pri- 
ary researcher and entered into the spread sheet. At the 
ame time, where a particular answer or thought given by one 
f the participants did not make sense, the primary researcher 
sed contextual inquiry techniques to elicit more information 
nd talk to the participants about that aspect. Once a consen- 
us has been reached on the understanding, the agreed an- 
wer was entered on the spread sheet. 
.2. CLIFOD questionnaire 
he questionnaire consisted of 98 questions, presented in 
 spread sheet, devised to align with the meta-model. This 
uestionnaire follows the meta-model using the three over- 
rching phases explanation; risk assessment and decision in the 
uestionnaire and the aspects beneath each phase to guide 
he questions asked within each phase.1 1 A full list of the CLIFOD questions can be accessed at: https: 
/github.com/JaneHB/CIOpenData . 
w
w.2.1. CLIFOD Phase I – explanation 
or the explanation phase, the meta-model requires that 
ackground details are captured about 5 aspects: the open 
ataset (i.e. the attributes , the actors and their roles , the transmis- 
ion principles and the prevailing context (see Fig. 1 ). In CLIFOD 
his was translated into a series of questions within each as- 
ect. These questions were devised with reference to CI, look- 
ng at the decision heuristics identified in the meta-model as 
elevant for this phase (DH1-4). For example, for the attributes,
 series of questions about each attribute were formulated to 
lign with CI and the meta-model.2 
.2.2. CLIFOD Phase II – risk assessment 
or phase II, CLIFOD takes the information collated in the ex- 
lanation phase and uses this to to inform the risk assess- 
ent. The risk assessment then uses this information to in- 
orm the questions based first, on the 4 aspects identified 
n the meta-model. For example, for the regulatory compli- 
nce element identified as one of the aspects in the meta- 
odel, questions were asked about any legal obligations or 
onstraints that may influence the change in information flow 
see ‘Regulations’ in Fig. 2 ). For the supporting questions, DH5- 
 were identified in the meta-model as relevant and thus,
hese were used to inform the questions in the risk assess- 
ent phase of CLIFOD. 
In addition, in CLIFOD, a scoring mechanism has been 
dded to assist practitioners in gauging the likely severity and 
mpact of the risks identified. These scores were captured us- 
ng an established risk scoring method, the traffic light mark- 
ng system, which denotes risks using traffic light colours of 
ed, amber and green based on ratings given, i.e. high (red),
edium (amber) or low (green) ( Heiser, 2008 ). Because an- 
wers given as part of the risk assessment are likely to be sub-
ective and require expert input to make a decision, the inten- 
ion for this scoring was not to calculate or compute a score,
ather to provide practitioners with a focal point that can be 
asily referenced in the final phase and thus, aid in making an 
nformed decision. 
Finally, to ensure the positive impact assessment identified 
s another aspect in the meta-model is captured, a section 
as added for this at the end of the risk assessment in CLI-
OD that asks practitioners to identify what positive values 
he proposed change in information flows is likely to bring (see 
ig. 2 ). 
.2.3. CLIFOD Phase III – decision 
he final phase involves making and recording the decision 
hich should be informed by the answers provided in phases 
 and II. Here, the meta-model requires that the decision is 
ecorded by completing the following aspects: the decision and,
s part of this record the: findings , which need to include the
easoning behind why that decision was made ( reason ) and 
hat mitigation, if any, needs to be put in place before pub- 
ication ( mitigating steps ). In addition a responsibility matrix 
RACI, see Section 4.3 ) needs to be completed to record; who 
ill be responsible for what ( actors and the timeframe within 
hich this will happen ( time ), see Fig. 3 . 2 Ibid 1. 
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 We recognise that this alone will not ensure that all privacy
risks are identified, no privacy risk assessment can do that as
any risk assessment is only as good as the practitioner who
conducts it. However, by providing a step-by-step approach
to conducting the privacy risk assessment that accounts for:
what data is collected, the actors; how the data is transmit-
ted and the context, CLIFOD helps practitioners identify and
consider all the various aspects that can influence and affect
the privacy risk. Thus, CLIFOD provides practitioners with a
framework that can be used to apply the same format and
questions to all assessments which will help ensure a consis-
tent and repeatable privacy risk assessments is conducted for
each dataset before publication occurs. This in turn will help
provide assurance and enable public bodies to keep a record of
all decisions made and the reasoning behind these decisions.
6.3. Findings 
The study ran three datasets through CLIFOD that the LA had
already published. In applying CLIFOD, we found that, it was
necessary to explain the reasoning behind each set of ques-
tions in greater detail than that provided so as to elicit fuller,
more considered responses. For example, the practitioners
were unclear as to why each attribute and actor had to be con-
sidered. This resulted in an in-depth discussion around the
merits of breaking the dataset down in this manner and why it
was necessary to provide the level of detail that CLIFOD sought
to capture. However, once a discussion around the first few at-
tributes and how these might or might not have privacy im-
plications in light of the informational norms, values and con-
text had ensued, the practitioners seemed to grasp the con-
cept and began to really think about the data in context. This
then made the process much more fluid for considering the
actors, transmission principles etc. and resulted in some inter-
esting insights both for the practitioners and the researchers.
This exercise took three hours and resulted in the following
findings. 
RQ1 asked about the inability to define the end user. Where
a public body changes the data flow from internal sharing be-
tween departments to publishing in open format, a number of
elements will change. First, the fundamental roles will be af-
fected in that the receiver will be anyone who downloads the
data ( end user ) and therefore, the flow and context will change
from an internal stakeholders processing data for a particular
purpose (e.g. to record benefit payment to/from a citizen) to
the end user, who may use the same data for creating an appli-
cation that displays number of people in arrears or any other
purpose they see fit. This will change the risks associated with
the data as it is impossible to accurately predict what the end
user might or might not decide to do with the data. However,
using CLIFOD can help reduce the risks of personal data be-
ing published by helping public bodies identify and mitigate
against these risks in a consistent, repeatable manner. 
Thus, we found that despite the lack of ability to define the
end user and all three transmission principles, the framework
appeared sufficiently effective in arriving at a consensual an-
swer in determining whether or not a data set should be pub-
lished in its current format. We therefore contend that using
CLIFOD, provides a timely opportunity for practitioners to en-
sure all the aspects and contextual nuances of releasing thedata are considered, thereby effectively acting as a very effec-
tive safeguard to making sure appropriate mitigations are put
in place prior to publication. 
RQ2 hypothesised that the CI framework would result in
most datasets being deemed unsuitable for publication. The
framework determined that two of the datasets considered in
the case study were deemed unsuitable for publication in their
current format. Some of the attributes within the datasets
were considered to be personal or sensitive with potential –
if linked to external data – to pose a threat to privacy. Despite
this, the data had been published in compliance with a legal
obligation placed on the LA. The final dataset considered was
not only deemed unsuitable for publication, it contained both
sensitive attributes and directly identifying data. However, be-
cause consent had been sought from the data subjects prior
to publication, the LA considered that, as data protection had
not been breached, the data could be published. These results
would therefore suggest that RQ2 hypothesis is true. However,
the sample used was small so that whilst all three datasets
considered were unsuitable in their current format, a wider
studies would need to be conducted to confirm or otherwise. 
7. Discussion 
Practitioners remain unclear on how best to preserve privacy
in respect of open data publishing, so much so that, para-
phrasing from the words of one Public Sector Senior Manager
interviewed in a previous study: “the easiest thing is to not make
the data available. You’re not going to make any mistakes if you don’t
make the data available” ( Barry and Bannister, 2014 ). However,
in the current climate of openness and transparency, public
bodies will increasingly find it difficult, if not impossible, to
not publish any open data, if they are to meet public expec-
tations, and indeed, their legal obligations under ROPSIR, FOI
and similar legislation. 
To some extent this can be addressed by technical inter-
vention which can help mitigate against personal data being
made available. For example, using anonymisation or redac-
tion techniques prior to releasing the data (e.g. ICO, 2012;
Lablans et al., 2015; Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010; Samarati,
2001 ). To that end, it was found that some technical inter-
vention had been conducted on two of the datasets published
with some attributes having been removed from the original
dataset prior to publication to ensure no personal informa-
tion was published. Despite this, as a result of applying CLI-
FOD, questions were raised around some of the individual at-
tributes within the data and whether, if linked to external
data, these could pose a threat to privacy. Much discussion
took place around this and the LA conceded that, had they ap-
plied the framework prior to publication, different decisions
may have been arrived at with regard to which attributes to
release. However, for both datasets, the LA were bound by a le-
gal obligation to publish and therefore, any such decision was
outside the remit of the practitioners taking part in the case
study. 
An alternative way that has been proposed to address this,
would be to not release the full dataset, rather, allow some
form of controlled access to the data (as proposed by Nis-
senbaum in Conley et al., 2012 ). For example, if practitioners
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aere to apply a differential privacy approach as an alternative 
o making the full data available to the database query out- 
uts (i.e. adding “random noise”; Dwork, 2006 ), this would ad- 
ress the issue of not knowing who the recipient is as the full 
ataset is never released. Perhaps as an alternative to making 
ata fully available as open data, LAs and other public bod- 
es should consider some form of controlled access to the raw 
ata. 
It is possible that a higher authority may have considered 
he privacy implications of the datasets that carry a legal obli- 
ation of publication and deemed the risks acceptable in light 
f the wider public good, this was not considered as part of 
he study and we therefore acknowledge that this could pose 
 threat to the validity of the study. 
.1. How informed can consent for open data be? 
he third open dataset contained personal information about 
lanning applications submitted by citizens for development 
f property, and details of any agreed peripheral work agreed 
o be undertaken by the applicant as part of the development.
his is of concern, not just because the dataset contained 
dentifying information, but also because it could be directly 
inked to a separate dataset freely available online: planning 
pplications. All planning applications are subject to public in- 
pection under UK planning regulations and therefore, in sub- 
itting an application, applicants know the information they 
rovide may be shared with interested third parties. While all 
f the applicants in this file had given consent and arguably,
any applications will originate from developers and/or busi- 
esses, some will originate from citizens wishing to improve 
heir own homes. For these applicants, while they will have 
onsented as part of the application process, they may not 
ully appreciate the potential privacy risks. 
It is one thing that interested parties such as neighbours 
re consulted as part of the planning process, quite another 
hat anyone can obtain all of one’s details including layout of 
ne’s property by downloading this from a website. If we were 
hen to consider how such data could be linked to other avail- 
ble data, we could soon build a full picture of that individ- 
al, including home address and full name. The study partic- 
pants did not capture the original data, nor made decisions 
round consent, rather, they were publishing existing data for 
hich decisions around consent had already been made in 
ccordance with policy. Therefore, this paper did not go into 
ufficient details to establish to what extent consent was fully 
nformed or explained, but it was established that the applica- 
ion will not be considered without consent being given. This 
aises questions about how informed such consent might ac- 
ually be. Thus, consideration needs to be given to questions 
f both processes and consent in these circumstances. Fur- 
hermore, knowing that technical privacy intervention can go 
ome way towards safeguarding such data, a wider discussion 
s needed around when data should or should not be made 
ublic. 
.2. Opportunities for users 
he fact that planning applications are open data could 
e used by applicants opportunistically. For example, an pplicant on a budget considering building an extension to 
heir home, may not be able to afford employing experts to 
ssist in the application process. These applicants could use 
he open data to research previous similar applications and 
se this information to inform how best to phrase or pre- 
are their application to ensure a successful outcome. Alter- 
atively, a user could use insights gleaned from this open data 
o strengthen and enhance any objection they have to a partic- 
lar application in their neighbourhood being given approval.
.3. Practitioners feedback on CLIFOD 
hile largely effective, some of the questions within CLI- 
OD were redundant, and others required modification 
nd further explanation. For example, following the initial 
iscussions around the need for all attributes and actors to 
e considered mentioned earlier, it transpired that, as part 
f answering the initial questions on attributes, many of the 
uestions that followed were answered as part of those initial 
esponses. Consequently, these questions require revision in 
uture adaptations of CLIFOD. 
Once the case study had been conducted, practitioners 
ere asked whether they felt the fact that the end user could 
ot be defined had prevented them from considering how the 
ata might be perceived in light of informational norms, or 
n the context of potentially conflicting values or morals. The 
ractitioners felt that, rather than acting as an obstacle, this 
erved as a reminder that extra care and time needs to be 
aken when considering privacy implications of publishing in- 
ormation in open format. Further, our study highlighted how 
ailing to apply an initial holistic overview of the whole dataset 
ad resulted in privacy sensitive data being published. 
.4. Design implications 
he implications of these findings for design are that we, the 
echnical community, need to look at ways we can incorporate 
ot just syntactic or semantic privacy but also, holistic privacy 
nto our designs. For open data, privacy needs to be considered 
n a more strategic manner before publication occurs, i.e. at a 
uch earlier stage in the design process. 
. Limitations 
his paper has looked at how practitioners can make better 
nformed, and therefore more effective, decisions about pri- 
acy risk for open data before publication occurs. This involves 
ooking at historic data often collected by disparate depart- 
ents where the decision maker(s) have had no input into 
ow data was collected, processed or stored. Therefore, the 
ssessment has been limited to privacy risks associated with 
ublication of that data in open format only. We acknowledge 
hat, conducting a simultaneous or subsequent security risk 
ssessment to establish what security measures should be put 
n place to protect the data going forward would enhance the 
ffectiveness of the outcome. This will be addressed as part of 
uture work. 
We acknowledge the quality and outcome of conducting 
 privacy risk assessment will depend on the expertise and 
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 quality of the assessment practitioner and/or team. However,
this we contend is the case for any risk assessment, the more
detail and background knowledge the team have in the partic-
ular subject, the more detailed and thorough the risks identi-
fied. 
With regards to the conceptual meta-model presented in
this work, the only aspect of the meta-model that was not fully
tested and validated as part of the CLIFOD case study was the
decision (Phase III, Fig. 3 in the meta-model). The reason this
aspect was not really tested was that all the datasets that were
assessed had already been published and thus, a decision had
already been made. However, the finding that all the datasets
assessed using CLIFOD contained potentially identifying in-
formation, showed that not conducting a privacy-specific risk
assessment has resulted in personal data being made public.
Thus, these findings illustrate the effectiveness of the meta-
model and CLIFOD, as described in this paper, and how these
can be successfully applied in practice. Further, they also high-
light the importance of devising a privacy-specific risks as-
sessment that practitioners can apply in practice ( Henriksen-
Bulmer and Faily, 2017 ). 
9. Future work 
Future work will look to further explore how the conceptual
framework and CLIFOD can be used for assessing the suitabil-
ity of publishing or sharing any type of data, not just open
data. In addition, consideration will be given to how suitable
the meta-model and CLIFOD will be to other areas of privacy
decision making process such as FOI. As part of this, an ex-
ploration of whether CLIFOD might be more accurate if the
decision making process is divided into specialisms. Thus, ex-
perts within each decision making area, such as policy, law,
data management etc. would be asked to complete sections
relating to their area of expertise, and, as a result, a more in-
formed decision being arrived at. 
However, our findings indicate that making practitioners
understand and appreciate the concepts and contextual nu-
ances involved in assessing privacy in context, requires ex-
planation and steerage from experienced practitioners or aca-
demics to be effective. Therefore, more research into this area
is necessary to establish whether and how we can better ex-
plain CI so that practitioners can complete contextual privacy
assessments without needing an expert in-situ. 
Moreover, to strengthen the application of both the meta-
model and CLIFOD, work will be carried out to explore com-
plimentary security risk assessment and privacy threat mod-
elling frameworks, such as the IRIS security framework ( Faily
and Fléchais, 2010 ), and the LINDDUN privacy threat mod-
elling framework ( Wuyts et al., 2014 ). The work will look at
whether these frameworks can be adapted to enhance any
resulting tool support developed, with a view to assess how
these principles might be incorporated. This will enable both
privacy by design and security by design to be considered and
thus, allow practitioners to not only identify and assess pri-
vacy risk but also safeguard the data in the future, building on
theoretically grounded and validated frameworks. 10. Conclusion 
This paper has looked at how practitioners can make in-
formed privacy risk decisions using contextual integrity in
practice. The meta-model created in this paper, illustrates that
it is possible to break CI down into its component parts. In do-
ing so, the meta-model shows how, by breaking CI down into
logical phases and modelling how these interlink, a decision-
flow can be established which can be followed in a methodi-
cal and systematic format when making decisions about pri-
vacy risks. The effectiveness of this approach was illustrated
in Section 5 , where we demonstrated how the meta-model
can be used to support strategic privacy risk decision mak-
ing through a worked example that applied the concepts to a
hypothetical public body, a public library. Finally, we validated
the robustness and effectiveness of the model by demonstrat-
ing how the conceptual model was translated into a practical
questionnaire, CLIFOD, that practitioners can follow in a step-
by-step manner to the assess privacy risks associated with
publishing datasets as open data. 
The findings from the CLIFOD case study highlighted that
despite legislative constraints and guidelines, public bodies
do struggle to meet their legal obligations in open data pub-
lishing. We found that a lack of sufficient understanding, pro-
cesses and resources to address these obstacles only serve to
increase these barriers. As a result, many fear adverse con-
sequences such as litigation could result from making data
available ( Barry and Bannister, 2014 ). This paper has looked at
one of these barriers, privacy, and shown how inadequacies
in existing processes have resulted in identifying information
being made public as part of existing open datasets already
published. 
Practitioners raised concerns about a lack of guidance and
understanding in how to deal with privacy in practice. We
found that despite some level of privacy assessment taking
place prior to publication, such as removing some of the at-
tributes prior to publication, some personal information is
still being published which would indicate that existing pro-
cesses lack enough rigour to sufficiently safeguard users pri-
vacy. Thus, these are valid concerns that, if not addressed, will
likely lead to more sensitive data being published without the
full consent of the users whose data is made available open
source. 
We have shown how the conceptual model and CLIFOD can
assist in providing public bodies with a means of assessing the
balance between the privacy of the data subject and the needs
of the LA and thus, provides an important first step towards
preserving users privacy. Further, both the meta-model and
CLIFOD are generalisable to other privacy decision processes
and, as such, could be equally applied to any other requests for
information received by a public body such as an FOI request.
The contribution to design is to highlight that a need exists
for earlier, more holistic assessment of datasets as a whole,
rather than just at attribute level is needed, and we believe
this conceptual model and CLIFOD can start the discussion by
showing one practical way of assessing privacy risks in light
of the people, values, norms and the surrounding context. 
We applied this to open data utilisation, an understudied
area that the public bodies are keen to promote to help their
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Pase in obtaining additional traction, utilisation and buy-in 
hat can allow them to expand on their open data projects.
n doing so, we illustrated the significance of the conceptual 
odel, and how these concepts can be practically applied us- 
ng CLIFOD as a practical tool that practitioners can use to 
ssess privacy risk, thereby reducing the likelihood of a data 
reach through better informed decision making. 
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